Tag Archives: Actor-Network-Theory

Comparing Freudian and Object-oriented Readings of Marie de France’s “Equitan”

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I’d forgotten about Dr. Seaman’s request for our paper proposals, which seem so far back now that my paper’s all done with and only three finals separate me and home.  But here it is, as requested.  I took Marie de France’s lai, “Equitan,” and performed both an object-oriented reading (ANT) and a psychoanalytical (Freudian) reading of the text.  I chose a Freudian analysis as my second contemporary critical reading approach as I couldn’t think of any reading less concerned with objects than Freud’s, especially when examining the id, ego, and superego.  By reading characters in a work as representatives of the psyche and focusing on the importance of an individual’s mind, objects lose their importance. For example, a bath is no longer a bath, but a representation for a man’s desire to return to his mother’s womb which reflects his immaturity.  The bath is a product of the mind that isn’t really there and has no agency whatsoever.  Even when an object is important to the tale, its power is merely a reflection of the subconscious.  So reduced are things in a Freudian reading that they no longer can be called objects- they’re visible but aren’t really there.
I argue that a Freudian reading of a text diminishes the power of things to a level below even that of objects, and as such, analyzing a text via an object-oriented approach adds new depth and meaning to a work.  The relevance of ANT and other object-oriented approaches can be verified through this comparison.

Viruses as Backstabbing Allies: A Fever-Induced Rant on the Definition of LIFE and the End of TIME

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We just can’t get through a class discussion recently without mentioning alliances or networks, now can we?  Alliances with objects are inescapable in the lais we’ve read, including “Emare,” whose plot is driven by letters, a ship, and a robe, among others.  Emare’s “alliance” with the robe had its up and downs, as it both led to her love with her husband and led to her banishment by the mother.  But in the end, as in all lais, the story ended with Emare on top, with the net result of her alliance leading to fortune and a happy life.  Does this suggest that all alliances with things are for the best?  Perhaps, but a happy ending is an essential quality of the British lai, and perhaps not all networks and alliances end for the better.  Especially since I’ve entered into an alliance with a special “thing” this week, a virus.

Now, the “thingness” of viruses has been up to debate for a while now.  In short, they are composed of organic matter, eat, and reproduce, yet they do not autonomously self-reproduce and are thus damned by the scientific community to the level of “thing,” as opposed to the vibrant level of organism.  Yes, we have beaten to death the idea that all matter is on the same level of existence, as things (anything, really) are only judged by their ability to act as actants, to influence or redefine other things.  And this virus certainly is an actant, which led to my absence yesterday and has directed my discussion towards its existence.  Does that mean the virus has agency?  It certainly changed my plans for this week, limiting my actions and “forcing” me to feel rather miserable.  I’m really not sure how to answer that question at this point, but hopefully I’ll be able to when my body is done hosting this rude guest.  Whether the virus “wants” to or not, it’s destroying my cells and making clones of itself.  In fact, that is its very purpose- to inject its RNA and produce clones of itself.  But calling this agency is the same as claiming that a river chooses to flow into the ocean.  This is its natural predisposition, and consciousness may be far removed from the virus and its natural life choices.

Is my alliance with this actant going to be beneficial in the end?  I’m full of questions today, and I’m afraid that this one in particular may be impossible to answer.  Who knows, maybe missing class was for the best, and allowed me to avoid some tragic end the other day, maybe I’ll emerge from this sickness with a greater appreciation for life, and do great things because of it and change the world.  Maybe my changes will lead to a post-apocalyptic dystopia far after I’ve passed away and become one with the grass.  With lais or any writing, there is a clear ending point in the text.  A last word, a final page.  But in life, there is none, at least none that I can comprehend.  The net result of my life, or actions I took while under the influence of an actant, are an eternal mystery that can only be judged at the end of time.  But for now, I judge this actant as harmful to my alliance with things, yet I think it for helping me create these thoughts as I type in a feverish delirium.

Embracing Change

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The social sciences, according to Bruno Latour, seek to explain the “presence of something at once invisible yet tangible, taken for granted yet surprising, mundane but of baffling subtlety…” (Latour 21). We, as human beings, struggle to define our social interactions by labeling them. However, most of these interactions (especially involving non-human entities) are so complex as to preclude the need for strict categorization. In attempting to tame “the wild beast”, we forget that the beast resists our attempts to categorize it.

Other disciplines, like cartography, use abstract means of making sense of its findings. Latour says that (in reference to the community of social sciences), “we, too, should find our firm ground on shifting sands…” (Latour 24). Making sense of the world requires a theoretical standpoint, particularly when dealing with the social. A more abstract approach is the better way to tackle questions and/or problems of such enormous complexity, rather than preempting the reactions with a ready-made box to facilitate “organization.”

Latour defends ANT theory in conveying the overall message that the social sciences need to embrace change. Rather than rely on strict categories to define or order the social, sociologists should get used to the unpredictability inherent in trying to explain the interactions between the human and non-human. Also, recognizing that social forces are unpredictable puts more of the emphasis on the reactions, rather than the one observing the reactions (who most likely has a preconceived notion for what “category” something fits in anyway). In other words, “the task of defining and ordering the social should be left to the actors themselves, not taken up by the analyst” (Latour 23). Latour’s whole concept of “reassembling the social” centers on, first, changing what we perceive to belong in a certain category and, then, questioning the usefulness of those categories in and of themselves.

Yates, Latour, and Bennett

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This week I read the Yates essay before reading the Latour introduction, and I am glad I did because a lot of the difficulty that Latour warns us about is difficulty that I experienced while trying to read the Yates essay.  I could definitely relate to the immediate satisfaction that Latour talks about with how sociologists are able to “jump straight ahead to connect vast arrays of life and history, to mobilize gigantic forces, to detect dramatic patterns emerging out of confusing interactions, to see everywhere in the cases at hand yet more examples of well-known types, to reveal behind the scenes some dark powers pulling the strings” (Latour 22).  That is exactly what I was trying to do with those oranges.  I read the first couple of pages of the Yates essay a few times searching for some clue I missed about these oranges that I did not receive until the end of the essay—what a relief that was.  Yates did a good job of “let[ting] the actors deploy the full range of controversies in which they are immersed” (Latour 23) before saying exactly why the oranges were so important at the end.  It felt like a test of sorts.

I could also relate to the cartographer that Latour writes about (23-4) who struggles in figuring out how she will include all of these different aspects of reports while still making sense.  I feel that way when writing a term paper, and find that if I attempt to stick to the conventional paper writing method—just like the cartographer will struggle with conventional cartography—of outline first, then introduction, body, and conclusion I have a really difficult time.  Why?  Because I am trying to force those abstractions into concepts without letting them fully form yet which happens in the process of actually writing the essay.  How can I introduce what I have not even started writing yet?

One last thing:  Near the end of the introduction Latour writes, “Be prepared to cast off agency, structure, psyche, time, and space along with every other philosophical and anthropological category, no matter how deeply rooted in common sense they may appear to be” (24-5).  That reminded me of when Jane Bennett writes that “[f]or this task, demystification, that most popular of practices in critical theory, should be used with caution and sparingly, because demystification presumes that at the heart of any event or process lies a human agency that has illicitly been projected into things.  This hermeneutics of suspicion calls for theorists to be on high alert for signs of the secret truth (a human will to power) below the false appearance of nonhuman agency” (xiv).

Some Gloves, a Women, and a Fairy: a Flattening of Perspective

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In Sir Degare, there seems to be a lot of interesting things going on with the interplay between different actants within the same network, but within some sort of power hierarchy. It seems to me that there are three distinct levels of actor: objects or things like the magic gloves and all of the other tokens that Degare has been given to help him in his quest, the humans who he interacts with in the pursuit of his quest and in his life in general, and the highest on the spectrum, the fairies who seem to rise up the ordinary lives and rules of human society and in fact are the ones who ultimately call Degare to adventure in the first place because of his pursuit of his father. The mediations between these three levels interact and intervene in a Degare’s life in many different ways and without this web of actants, he would not only fail in his quest but wouldn’t even exist.

The first set of actants is probably the weakest at least if we judge it in terms of human subjectivity. These objects seemingly have no power when compared to the humans that they act in conjunction with, but the fact remains that without them human (and fairy) would fail in their execution of their will. For example, when Degare’s mother is given a token by the Degare’s father in order that their son may be known by the father when the time comes; without that token the reunion would have been impossible and thus the will being exercised is contingent on Degare being in an action network that includes particular objects.

To me though the most interesting inversion the tradition of the object-subject paradigm that places human design firmly at the center, is the way in which Degare was born. His mother was raped by a male fairy, made into a kind of object, by the more powerful and willful energies of a being that was most definitively not human. The fairy seems to think of this as rather ordinary, a turn of events that might be as every day to him as the mother using a hair brush or a fork, the only difference being that here the happens to be able to talk. This different way of viewing power dynamics gives a bit of a new perspective on where objects and humans might fall into a spectrum of an actant network. The use of a theoretically more powerful being in our consideration of object-subject relations makes us better able to understand the importance of honoring all members of the action network.

Differentiating Thing Theory and Actor-Network Theory

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Today I re-read Le Fresne, and tried to pick out an object and analyze it using thing theory and also actor-network theory. However, after trying to do so, I became very confused about what exactly the difference is between the two theories.

For this example, I chose to look at the garments and the ring that Fresne’s mother gives her before her servant takes her to the abbey and leaves her in the ash tree. To me, these objects most obviously play a role in the story, so much that they are arguably just as important as the characters themselves. These objects represent more than just physical items. They, like we discussed in class, almost represent Fresne’s identity. They are also symbols of nobility and wealth, allowing those who know nothing about Fresne to at least know that she comes from a good family. Therefore, these objects clearly work as actors, considering without them, Fresne’s mother would most likely have never known that this was her daughter and the entire story would unraveled in a completely different way and consequently had a whole new set of morals, if any, in the end. I think it is fair to say that these objects “bend space around” themselves, but how is this different than thing theory? I’ve had the thought that the difference is that thing theory incorporates ideas and unpredictable actions as well as objects, but couldn’t an idea or an action not be an actor too? When trying to project these theories onto the garments in Le Fresne, I had a great deal of trouble differentiating the two, and, because they seem to have so many similarities to me, they sort of just combined themselves into one theory. I’m probably missing some very important and blatant point that would solve all of my problems, but for now I’m having trouble distinguishing the theories.

Everyday Objects

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The issues brought up in the readings this week are strange, baffling, and overall very interesting. Our readings of the introduction to “thing theory” in Ben Brown’s essay and the possible practical and political imports of these ideas, were difficult but after the discussions in class I defiantly have a better handle on what is going on. I think though that the “What is Actor-Network Theory?”(ANT) article is the one that gave me a more vivid understanding of the ideas in the other readings and specifically the last excerpt from Sidorova & Sarker.

Sidorova & Sarker break down all of the different aspects of the network and what each of these components can be. As I understand it, the actor network is an accumulation of any number of objects, ideas, people, anything really, that are working toward the same interest. Anything that is in a person’s environment that helps them to do something. In Reijo Miettinen’s section the example is given that “the work of science consists of the enrollment and juxtaposition of heterogeneous elements-rats, test tubes, colleagues, journal articles, funders, grants, papers at scientific conferences, and so on…” This gives a rather clear image of how different actors, organic and inorganic, must function in order for any sort of work to be done. I can’t help but think that if this computer I am writing on were to malfunction or the blog were to not publish my post that I would be unable to complete this assignment for the week on time. This way of think has started to deepen my appreciation of the things that I need in order to function on a day to day basis and without which I would be unable to function. Things like dishes and clothes that- if they are dirty for example- can present a drastic obstacle into my everyday comings and goings.

….So as a p.s. to this post, the bit about the blog not publishing this post happened. This is the second time it has happened and I had to find somebody in my network who knew what was wrong. Shouldn’t be anymore problems, sorry for the inconvenience Professor Seaman.

This Tangled Web

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The power of a “thing” is an unusual concept to wrap your head around.  It’s something I’ve been thinking about since class this past Monday when someone brought up the idea that a thing tends to have power over us when it is not functioning properly.  Looking back at how an uncooperative printer or a misguided stapler has altered my daily plans, it becomes evident to me that to a certain extent these inanimate objects do assert themselves.  This assertion of the object almost always directly affects me.  Take for example a couple of days ago I had a paper due in a class and I needed two physical copies to hand in.  I woke up early the morning it was due and went to the library to print it off.  My first copy printed just fine, but my second copy was lost in space (or something like that).  Of course, this incident made me late for class and was the start to a somewhat yucky day.

Reading the preface to Vibrant Matter I was particularly struck with the short explanation of chapter one.  In this chapter, Jane Bennett, will explore the idea of “thing-power.”  From this very preliminary reading I gathered that thing-power is when an ordinary, inorganic object asserts itself and displays traces of independence.  Before having the conversation Monday I probably would have responded to this idea a bit differently because it’s hard to imagine without proper examples.  Honestly, I would have thought to myself, “Well obviously this Bennett lady is a nut because objects can’t have power or independence.”

Things definitely don’t have the kind of power seen in Disney movies where cars talk and Buzz, the toy astronaut saves the day, but they certainly have some type of power and independence and it seems to be their power and independence paired with our own personal abilities that allow successful maneuvers.  This brings me to the actor-network theory.  I’m not positive if I have fully grasped the concept or not so someone please help me out if you feel like it means something else.  From the several small definitions of the actor-network theory it seems that this theory is stating that with every task their is a web of interactions and these interactions exists between both non human and human actors.

Humans are almost always aware of the interactions they have with each other, but they are mostly oblivious to the interactions they have with the non-human entities.  Maybe not quite “oblivious,” but instead I mean that most people wouldn’t recognize that they have an interaction with a computer.  I believe that Bennett and many other people that investigate the thing theory are trying to illustrate that while “things” or objects need humans, humans also need the interaction with these things.  What I’m trying to say is that everything is linked together and sometimes humans are not as in control as we believe ourselves to be.  Technology probably wouldn’t exist without humans but humans might also not exist without technology.

What does Bennett mean by a “more distributive agency”?

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I would like to begin my blog this week by examining Dr. Seaman’s request on the Preview of Week 3 to begin thinking about what a “more distributive agency” could be (Bennett ix).  Bennett leads into this topic with a few terms coined by Bruno Latour, author of Reassembling the Social which we will be reading this semester, and how she finds his attempt to be admirable in “address[ing] multiple modes and degrees of effectivity” (viii-ix).  According to Bennett, this is Latour’s effort in moving towards that “more distributive agency.”

The word “more” is usually always used in comparison.  Therefore, it was right here that I gathered that Bennett may be setting herself apart from Latour.  For in Latour’s Actor-Network-Theory, any thing in existence that alters another thing is an actant.  I think that what Bennett is suggesting, then, is that by allowing his theory to include all and any thing that may have any effect is giving Latour a “more distributive agency”:  a wider application of his theory because it is all-encompassing.  I am led to further believe this because a couple of sentences later Bennett asserts that she “lavish[es] attention on specific ‘things,’ noting the distinctive capacities or effacious powers of particular material configurations” (ix).  Meaning, perhaps she has a smaller distributive agency than Latour does because she is being more specific.  In her preface she places a personal importance on a greener existence (x), which may also limit her distributive agency when compared to Latour’s.  Though, I am not able to fully make that claim yet only having read “What is Actor Network Theory?,” and not the actual theory itself (Martin Ryder).  However, just from reading that collection of responses to Latour it does not sound as if the things he focuses on are quite as particular as the ones that Bennett does.  In turn, this gives Latour a “more distributive agency.”